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Abstract
Turning unemployment into self-employment has become a major focus of German active
labour market policy (ALMP) in recent years. If eﬀective, this would not only reduce Germany’s
persistently high unemployment rate, but also increase its notoriously low self-employment rate.
Empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of such programmes is scarce. The contribution of the
present paper is twofold: ﬁrst, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of two start-up programmes for the
unemployed. Our outcome variables include the probability of being employed, the probability
of being unemployed, and personal income. Second, based on the results of this analysis, we
conduct an eﬃciency analysis, i.e., we estimate whether the Federal Employment Agency has
saved money by placing unemployed individuals in these programmes. Our results show that
at the end of the observation period, both programmes are eﬀective and one is also eﬃcient.
The considerable positive eﬀects present a stark contrast to ﬁndings from evaluations of other
German ALMP programmes in recent years. Hence, ALMP programmes aimed at moving the
unemployed into self-employment may prove to be among the most eﬀective, both in Germany
and elsewhere.
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Turning unemployment into self-employment has become a major focus of German active labour
market policy (ALMP) in recent years. Whereas the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) funded
only 37,000 business start-ups by formerly unemployed individuals in 1994, the number was already
above 350,000 in 2004 (approximately 250,000 in West Germany). This increase was driven, among
other things, by a new programme known as the ‘start-up subsidy’ (SUS, Existenzgr¨ undungszuschuss),
which was introduced in 2003 as part of the Hartz reforms. Unemployed individuals can now choose
between this and a second programme, the ‘bridging allowance’ (BA, ¨ Uberbr¨ uckungsgeld), which
was already implemented in the late 1980s. The two programmes diﬀer in their design, most im-
portantly regarding the amount and duration of the subsidy. Whereas the BA pays recipients the
same amount that they would have received in unemployment beneﬁts for a period of six months
(plus a lump sum to cover social security contributions), the SUS runs for three years, paying a
lump sum of e600/month for the ﬁrst year, e360/month for the second, and e240/month for the
third. If successful, these programmes could potentially not only decrease Germany’s persistently
high unemployment rate, but increase its notoriously low self-employment rate as well. Looking at
the FEA’s spending on ALMP, we clearly see the increasing priority assigned to these programmes
within the overall ALMP strategy. Whereas in 1994 only 0.6% of ALMP resources were allocated
to these measures, in 2004 this number was 17.2%. This corresponds to annual spending of over
e2.7 billion.
For all the aforementioned reasons, the high research interest in evaluating these programmes is
unsurprising. However, empirical evidence on start-up aid is very rare, not only in Germany but also
internationally. Meager (1996) summarises ﬁndings for ﬁve countries (Denmark, France, West Ger-
many, UK and US) and concludes that the evidence presented does not allow a conclusive assessment
of the overall eﬀectiveness of such schemes. Existing papers usually focus either on survival rates of
subsidised businesses, e.g., Cueto and Mato (2006), or compare start-ups by formerly unemployed
people with start-ups which were not created out of unemployment (see, e.g., Pfeiﬀer and Reize,
2000). The present paper takes a diﬀerent approach. Instead of comparing business start-ups by
formerly unemployed individuals with other start-ups, we compare the labour market outcomes of
the formerly unemployed entrepreneurs with other unemployed individuals. This approach is driven
by the consideration that start-up subsidies form one component of ALMP, and their eﬀectiveness
should thus be compared to other ALMP programmes. In recent years, empirical evidence on the
eﬀectiveness of German ALMP has been constantly growing. Following the introduction of new
legislation at the end of the 1990s (Sozialgesetzbuch III, Social Code III) and especially the Hartz
reforms in 2002, the FEA was required to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of its ALMP programmes. To
fulﬁl this obligation, researchers were provided access to the FEA’s administrative data and sev-
eral programmes were evaluated. For example, Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005) and Biewen,
Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V¨ olter (2006) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of vocational training (VT)
programmes, whereas Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2005) concentrate on job-creation schemes.
The ﬁndings are negative for job-creation schemes and mixed for vocational training programmes,
2where due to high locking-in eﬀects at the beginning of VT, positive eﬀects appear only after some
time.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the two start-up
programmes. Since the major goal of German ALMP is to avoid future unemployment and integrate
unemployed individuals into the primary labour market, we concentrate on the outcome variables
‘not unemployed’ and ‘in paid or self-employment’, and in addition, we analyse the programme’s
eﬀects on personal income. While most evaluations of ALMP stop at that point, we want to take
the analysis a step further. Thus, in the second step, we conduct an eﬃciency analysis based on
the results of the eﬀectiveness analysis. This analysis is designed to answer the question of whether
the FEA has saved money by helping people get out of unemployment and into self-employment (in
contrast to ﬁnancing their continued unemployment). It should be clear that the aim of this paper
is not to compare the relative success of the two programmes, e.g., with respect to the success of
the businesses themselves (number of employees, etc.). This is left to future studies.
Our analysis is based on a combination of administrative data from the FEA and a follow-up
survey. The follow-up survey was necessary because 1) administrative data are only available with
a certain time lag and 2) more importantly, they only contain information about employment for
which social security contributions are compulsory, which is not the case for self-employment. The
data contain approximately 3,100 participants in both programmes who founded a business in the
third quarter of 2003 in West Germany.1 The interviews took place at the beginning of 2005 and
2006, such that we observe individuals at least 28 months after programmes started. Whereas for
BA this means we can monitor the employment paths of individuals for at least 22 months after
the programme has ended, SUS was still ongoing at the end of our observation period. At this
stage, participants in SUS were in their third year of participation and were receiving a reduced
transfer payment. Hence, results for this programme are only preliminary and interpretation hinges
on this drawback. Additionally, we have a group of unemployed individuals (approx. 2,300) who
were eligible for either programme but did not choose to participate in the third quarter of 2003.
This nonparticipant group will function as our comparison group.
Given this informative data set, we base our analysis on the conditional independence assump-
tion and use a kernel matching estimators to estimate the treatment eﬀects. To test the sensitivity of
the results with respect to unobserved diﬀerences we also use a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategy as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). The results show that at the
end of our observation period both programmes are eﬀective in terms of the above-mentioned out-
come variables. Unemployment rates of participants are lower, and employment rates and personal
income are higher when compared to nonparticipants. However, only one of the programmes—the
bridging allowance—is also eﬃcient in terms of the cost-beneﬁt analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the German labour market
in the last decade, focusing on self-employment, unemployment, and active labour market policies,
whereas Section 3 summarises previous empirical ﬁndings. Section 4 outlines our evaluation ap-
1We concentrate on West Germany in this paper because the labour market and especially self-employment dy-
namics in East Germany are quite diﬀerent and have to be analysed separately.
3proach, while Section 5 describes the data used for the analysis and discusses some implementation
issues. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Unemployment, Self-Employment and Start-Up Subsidies in Ger-
many
Table 1 contains some summary statistics of the West German labour market. It can be seen that
the self-employment rate has remained relatively stable over the last decade, ﬂuctuating between
10 and 11% (relative to the workforce). Compared with other OECD countries, this is relatively
low. Blanchﬂower (2000) refers to numbers for 1996 and shows that only Denmark, Luxembourg,
Norway, and the United States have lower rates. On the other hand, the unemployment rate is
persistently high, ﬂuctuating between 7.3 and 9.1%.
To overcome this unemployment problem, the German government spends signiﬁcant amounts
on ALMP (approximately e12 billion in West Germany in 2004), including measures like vocational
training programmes, job creation schemes, employment subsidies, and self-employment of formerly
unemployed individuals.2
Table 1: Self-employment, Unemployment and Start-Up Subsidies in West Ger-
many, 1994-2004
1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Self-employeda (in %) 10.4 10.6 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.6 11.0
Unemployeda (in %) 8.1 9.1 8.4 7.5 7.3 7.9 8.8 8.8
Supported self-employment (Entries)
BA (in thousand) 22.2 66.2 65.9 59.3 62.0 86.9 115.5 137.4
SUS (in thousand) – – – – – – 68.0 113.8
Total (in thousand) 22.2 66.2 65.9 59.3 62.0 86.9 183.5 251.1
Totalb (in %) 0.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.5 6.7 9.0
ALMP expenditure (in bn Euro)
ALMP - Total 9.84 9.86 11.75 12.23 12.42 12.15 12.28 11.89
BAc 0.06 0.43 0.55 0.53 0.58 0.73 1.09 1.37
SUS – – – – – – 0.18 0.67
Sup. self-empl. (total) 0.06 0.43 0.55 0.53 0.58 0.73 1.27 2.05
Sup. self-empl. (in %) 0.6 4.4 4.7 4.4 4.6 6.0 10.3 17.2
a Relative to the workforce.
b Relative to all unemployed.
c The ﬁgures for the years 1994-1998 are approximated.
Source: Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit, various issues.
From 1986 to 2002, the bridging allowance was the only programme providing support to un-
employed individuals who wanted to start their own business. Its main goal is to cover basic costs
of living and social security contributions during the initial stage of self-employment. BA supports
2For a recent overview of German active labour market policy see Caliendo and Steiner (2005).
4the ﬁrst six months of self-employment by providing the same amount that the recipient of a BA
would have received if he or she had remained unemployed. Since the unemployment scheme also
covers social security contributions including health insurance, retirement insurance, etc., a lump
sum for social security is granted, equal to 68.5% of the unemployment support that would have
been received in 2003, adjusted annually. Unemployed people are entitled to BA conditional on
their business plan being approved externally, usually by the regional chamber of commerce. Thus,
approval of an individual’s application does not depend on the case manager at the local labour
oﬃce.
In January 2003, an additional programme was introduced to support unemployed people in
starting a new business. This ‘start-up subsidy’ was introduced as part of a large package of ALMP
programmes introduced through the Hartz reforms.3 The main goal of SUS is to secure the initial
phase of self-employment. It focuses on the provision of social security to the newly self-employed
person. The support is a lump sum of e600/month in the ﬁrst year. A growth barrier is imple-
mented in SUS such that the support is only granted if income is not expected to exceed e25,000
per year. The support shrinks to e360/month in the second year and e240/month in the third. In
contrast to the BA, SUS recipients are obligated to pay into the legal pension insurance fund, and
may claim a reduced rate for national health insurance (Koch and Wießner, 2003). When the SUS
was introduced in 2003, applicants did not have to submit business plans for prior approval, but
have been required to do so since November 2004, as is the case with the BA as well. See Table 2
for more details on both programmes.
Table 2: Design of the Programmes




Approval of the business plan by an
external source (e.g. chamber of com-
merce)
Unemployment beneﬁt receipt
Approval of the business required since
November 2004
Support: Participant receives UB for six months
To cover social security liabilities, an
additional lump sum of approx. 70%
is granted
Participants receive a ﬁxed sum
of e600/month in the ﬁrst year,
e360/month (e240/month) in the
second (third) year
Claim has to be renewed every year, in-
come is not allowed to exceed e25,000
per year
Other: Social security is left at the individual’s
discretion
Participants are required to join the le-
gal pension insurance and receive a re-
duced rate on the legal health insurance
Details: §57(1) Social Code III. §421 l Social Code III.
Hence, unemployed individuals can now choose between two programmes for help in starting
their own business. Table 1 contains some information on participants and spending in measures
promoting self-employment from 1994 to 2004. In 1994, about 1% of all unemployed individuals
participated in BA, and the FEA spent 0.6% of their total resources for ALMP on BA. Due to a
3Wunderlich (2004) provides a thorough overview of the Hartz reforms.
5legal change in 1995 that made it easier to receive a BA, these numbers increased steadily up to
2002, when 3.5% of the unemployed received a BA (6.0% of the spending). Table 1 also shows that
the introduction of the SUS did not replace the BA, but did make self-employment signiﬁcantly
more attractive for the unemployed. In 2004, as much as 9% of Germany’s unemployed participated
in these two programmes together, thus absorbing a share of 17.2% of the total spending for ALMP.
Individuals planning to exit unemployment by entering self-employment can now choose between
two alternative forms of start-up aid. One supports the ﬁrst six months of self-employment by
providing what the individual would have received in unemployment beneﬁts plus a lump sum for
social security contributions (BA), and the other provides a ﬁxed and declining amount for the
ﬁrst three years of self-employment with the risk of losing the support if the growth barrier is
exceeded (SUS). In this institutional framework, rational programme choice favours a BA if the
unemployment beneﬁts would be fairly high, and/or if the income generated through the start-up
ﬁrm is expected to exceed e25,000.
3 Previous Empirical Findings
In contrast to other ALMP programmes such as vocational training or job-creation schemes, the
empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of start-up subsidies for the unemployed is rather scarce.
This might be explained by the fact that in most countries start-up subsidies usually only form one
small component of ALMP. In 2003, the EU-15 countries spent an average of 0.697% of their GDP
on ALMP, but only 0.034% of GDP on start-up subsidies. That is, out of the total spending on
ALMP only 4.8% was used for these incentives (European Commission, 2005). The numbers in the
last section have shown that this has changed substantially in Germany.
The main indicators used for evaluating self-employment programmes are the survival rate,
the number of jobs created directly by the new business, and the employability and income of
participants. Additionally, it is usually of interest whether there have been deadweight losses or
displacement eﬀects.4 Additionally, one has to deﬁne the comparison group. Some studies do not
have a comparison group at all (and focus, e.g., solely on survival rates); others use start-ups by
those who were not previously unemployed as a benchmark to compare the income of self-employed
programme participants with the income of individuals in paid employment. We have already
pointed out that we use a diﬀerent approach in this paper, comparing the outcomes of participants
with other unemployed individuals. In the following we give a brief overview of the ﬁndings in
the literature on start-up subsidies for the unemployed, starting with some international evidence
before turning to the results for Germany.
Meager, Bates, and Cowling (2003) evaluate business start-up subsidies to young people (18-30
years) in the UK. They not only look at the characteristics and survival of the start-ups but also
compare the labour market outcomes of the participants with those of a comparison group. The
comparison group is chosen to be in the same age category and then matched on three criteria
4A deadweight loss occurs when behaviour is not changed due to the programme, e.g., when unemployed individuals
would also have entered self-employment in the absence of the subsidy. Displacement eﬀects take place, e.g., when
the businesses set up by the participants drive other existing (unsubsidised) businesses out of the market.
6(gender, region and employment status immediately before the date when the matched person
in the participant sample entered self-employment). Based on multinomial and standard logistic
regressions the authors conclude that participating in the programme does not have any signiﬁcant
impacts on subsequent employment or earnings chances.
Perry (2006) uses diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching to evaluate the impact
on males receiving an Enterprise Allowance grant in New Zealand between 1993 and 1995. This
programme has been providing start-up subsidies since 1990 and can be seen as an integrated
programme that provides business skills training as well as ﬁnancial aid (for at least 26 weeks).
The author’s results (measured up to two years after participation) indicate statistically signiﬁcant
beneﬁcial eﬀects for the participants, where the outcome variable is ‘not registered unemployed’.
Cueto and Mato (2006) analyse the success of self-employment subsidies in one region of Spain
using a Cox Proportional Hazards Model. They look at the determinants of survival (duration) of
self-employment and also estimate a competing risk model to distinguish between business failures
and other reasons why businesses that had received support were closed, e.g., the because the
individual had take a job and moved out of self-employment. Their study is based on data for
individuals who received the subsidy between 1996 and 2000 and their labour market outcomes
(still self-employed, unemployed, in paid employment) measured in December 2001. Hence, survival
for 2-5 years can be observed and the survival is approximately 93% after two and 76% after ﬁve
years.
Comparisons are diﬃcult due to the heterogeneity of the institutional settings of the diﬀerent
programmes, the economic circumstances in the respective countries, and the indicators used. The
assumed deadweight losses range from low to high and are usually based on survey information of
the participants (Meager, 1996). What should be kept in mind here is that even if a participant
would have started a business anyway—even without a subsidy—it is unclear whether it would
have been equally successful. Displacement eﬀects are hardly ever analysed and would require a
macroeconomic framework.
Conclusive evidence for Germany is even harder to ﬁnd. Pfeiﬀer and Reize (2000) use the ZEW
Firm Start-Up Panel in their study to compare a group of start-ups founded between 1993 and 1995
by formerly unemployed recipients of a BA to a group of start-ups not subsidised by a BA. Assessing
business survival and employment growth, they ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects for West and East Germany.
Whereas start-ups by the unemployed in the East German regions have a 6% lower one-year survival
probability, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be detected in West Germany. In terms of employment
growth, subsidised start-ups by the unemployed are no diﬀerent from non-subsidised start-ups.
Reize (2004) uses the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and estimates competing risk models
to model the paths out of unemployment. Comparing individuals moving into self-employment with
those moving into paid employment shows that after four years, the unemployment risk is lower for
the self-employed than for the other group. Both studies focus on the BA and have the problem of
a rather small group of participants. Empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of the SUS has not yet
been produced since the programme is relatively new. In the next section, we turn to a description
of our evaluation approach.
74 Identifying Average Treatment Eﬀects
4.1 Fundamental Evaluation Problem and Selection Bias
We base our analysis on the potential outcome framework, also known as the Roy(1951)-Rubin(1974)
model. The two potential outcomes are Y 1 (individual receives treatment, D = 1) and Y 0 (individ-
ual does not receive treatment, D = 0). The actually observed outcome for any individual i can be
written as: Yi = Y 1
i · Di + (1 − Di) · Y 0
i . The treatment eﬀect for each individual i is then deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between her potential outcomes: τi = Y 1
i − Y 0
i . Since we can never observe both
potential outcomes for the same individual at the same time, the fundamental evaluation problem
arises. We will focus on the most prominent evaluation parameter, which is the average treatment
eﬀect on the treated (ATT), and is given by:
E(Y 1 − Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
To see how selection bias might arise, we cast the discussion in familiar econometric notation








where the subscript t identiﬁes the time period. The functions g0 and g1 represent the relationship
between potential outcomes and the set of observable characteristics. U0 and U1 are error terms
which have zero mean and are assumed to be uncorrelated with regressors X. For the familiar
case of linear regression, the g functions specialise to g1(X) = Xβ1, and g0(X) = Xβ0 (see, e.g.,
(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997)).
Heckman and Robb (1985a) note that the decision to participate in treatment may be determined
by a prospective trainee, by a programme administrator, or both. Whatever the speciﬁc content
of the rule, it can be described in terms of an index function framework. Let INi be an index of
beneﬁts to the relevant decision-maker from participating in the programme. It is a function of
observed (Zi) and unobserved (Vi) variables. Therefore:
INi = f(Zi) + Vi. (3)
In terms of this function Di = 1 if INi > 0 and 0 otherwise. Except in case of randomised
experiments, the assignment process to treatment is most probably not random. Consequently,
the assignment process will lead to non-zero correlation between enrolment (Di) and the outcome’s
error term (U1,U0). This may occur because of stochastic dependence between (U1,U0) and Vi or
because of stochastic dependence between (U1,U0) and Zi. In the former case we have selection
on unobservables, and in the latter selection on observables (Heckman and Robb, 1985b). We will
combine two evaluation methods—matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences—to cover both possible
sources of selection bias.
84.2 Matching under Unconfoundedness
Matching is based on the conditional independence (or unconfoundedness) assumption, which states
that conditional on some covariates W = (X,Z), the potential outcomes (Y 1,Y 0) are independent
of D.5 Since we are interested in ATT only, we only need to assume that Y 0 is independent of D,
because the moments of the distribution of Y 1 for the treatment group are directly estimable. That
is:
Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness for Comparison Group:
Y 0 q D|W,
where q denotes independence. Clearly, this assumption may be a very strong one and has to be
justiﬁed on a case-by-case basis, since the researcher needs to observe all variables that simultane-
ously inﬂuence participation and outcomes. We will do so in Section 5.2. Additionally, it has to be
assumed that:
Assumption 2 Weak Overlap:
Pr(D = 1 | W) < 1,
for all W. This implies that there is a positive probability for all W of not participating, i.e., that
there are no perfect predictors which determine participation. These assumptions are suﬃcient for
identiﬁcation of the ATT, which can be written as:
τMAT
ATT = E(Y 1|W,D = 1) − EW[E(Y 0|W,D = 0)|D = 1], (4)
where the ﬁrst term can be estimated from the treatment group and the second term from the mean
outcomes of the matched comparison group. The outer expectation is taken over the distribution
of W in the treatment group.
As matching on W can become hazardous when W is of high dimension (‘curse of dimensional-
ity’), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of balancing scores b(W). These are functions
of the relevant observed covariates W such that the conditional distribution of W given b(W) is
independent of the assignment to treatment, that is, W q D|b(W). The propensity score P(W),
i.e., the probability of participating in a programme, is one possible balancing score. For partic-
ipants and nonparticipants with the same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates W
are the same, i.e., they are balanced across the groups. Hence, assumption 1 can be re-written as
Y 0 q D|P(W) and the new overlap condition is given by Pr(D = 1 | P(W)) < 1.
5See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for recent overviews regarding matching methods.
94.3 Combining Matching with Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
Even though we will argue in Section 5.2 that the CIA is most likely to hold in our setting, we will
test the sensitivity of our results with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. The matching estima-
tor described so far assumes that after conditioning on a set of observable characteristics, (mean)
outcomes are independent of programme participation. The conditional DID or DID matching es-
timator relaxes this assumption and allows for unobservable but temporally invariant diﬀerences in
outcomes between participants and nonparticipants. This is achieved by comparing the conditional
before/after outcomes of participants with those of nonparticipants. DID matching was ﬁrst sug-
gested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). It extends the conventional DID estimator
by deﬁning outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using semiparametric methods to con-
struct the diﬀerences. Therefore it is superior to DID as it does not impose linear functional form
restrictions in estimating the conditional expectations of the outcome variable, and it re-weights
the observations according to the weighting function of the matching estimator (Smith and Todd,
2005). If the parameter of interest is ATT, the DID propensity score matching estimator is based
on the following identifying assumption:
E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1] = E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0], (5)
where (t) is the post-treatment and (t0) the pre-treatment period. It also requires the common
support condition to hold and can be written as:
τCDID
ATT = E(Y 1
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1) − E(Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0). (6)
5 Implementing the Estimators
Having discussed our evaluation approach in the previous section, we now present details on the
implementation of the propensity score matching estimator. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) provide
an extensive overview of the issues arising when implementing matching estimators. They point out
that a crucial step is to discuss the likely validity of the underlying CIA. Hence, we deal with this
issue in Section 5.2, after having presented the data and some sample characteristics in Section 5.1.
This will be followed by an estimation of the propensity score in 5.3, the choice of the matching
algorithm in 5.4, and a discussion of matching quality in 5.5.
5.1 Data and Some Descriptives
We use a unique data set which combines administrative data from the FEA with survey data. For
the administrative part we use data based on the ‘Integrated Labour Market Biographies’ (ILMB,
Integrierte Erwerbs-Biographien) of the FEA, containing relevant register data from four sources:
employment history, unemployment support recipience, participation in active labour market mea-
sures, and job seeker history. One drawback of the ILMB data is that employment history covers
only employment that is subject to social security contributions. Since this is not the case for self-
employment, the register data does not provide any information on the employment status and/or
10income of self-employed individuals. A second drawback is that the ILMB data is usually only
available with a certain time lag. Hence, to get information about the success in self-employment
for a reasonable time period, we enriched the ILMB data with information from a computer-assisted
telephone interview.
To do so, we randomly drew participants from each programme who became self-employed
in the third quarter of 2003. Since we wanted to compare them with nonparticipants, we had
to choose a comparison group. Choosing such a group is a heavily discussed topic in the recent
evaluation literature. Although participation in ALMP programmes is not mandatory in Germany,
the majority of unemployed persons participate at some point in time. Thus, comparing participants
to individuals who never participate is inadequate, since it can be assumed that the latter group is
particularly selective.6 Sianesi (2004) discusses this problem for Sweden and argues that those who
never participate did not enter a programme because they had already found a job. Additionally,
since we did not know the future employment/participation status of the comparison group before
the interviews took place, we restricted this comparison group to those who were unemployed in the
third quarter of 2003, eligible for participation in either of the two programmes, but did not join a
programme in this quarter. What should be kept in mind is that these comparison group members
might participate in some ALMP programme after this quarter.7
To minimise the survey costs we used a crude propensity score matching approach to select
somewhat similar unemployed individuals.8 These individuals were interviewed twice. The ﬁrst
interview took place in January/February 2005 and the second in January/February 2006. This
enables us to observe the labour market activity of individuals for at least 28 months after pro-
grammes started. We compiled a sample of 3,100 individuals who had started a new business out
of unemployment. Of these, 1,082 individuals received a SUS and 2,018 received BA. Additionally,
a control group of 2,296 nonparticipants was assembled.
Table A.1 in the Appendix contains detailed descriptive statistics for all the available variables,
diﬀerentiated by treatment status and gender. To abbreviate the discussion, we focus here on the
most relevant variables and discuss diﬀerences between participants in both programmes and non-
participants. What should be kept in mind is the non-random sample of nonparticipants. Since we
used a crude matching approach to make individuals similar, the nonparticipant sample does not
represent a random sample of unemployed individuals. Clearly, this does not aﬀect our estimation
and interpretation strategy but should be kept in mind when interpreting the diﬀerences. Table 3
contains sample means of selected variables and in addition results from a t-test of mean equality
between participants and nonparticipants, where p1 (p2) refers to a test between nonparticipants
and participants in SUS (BA).
6Furthermore, it should be noted that using individuals who are observed to never participate in the programmes as
the comparison group may invalidate the conditional independence assumption due to conditioning on future outcomes
(see discussion in Fredriksson and Johansson, 2004).
7The actual number of nonparticipants who participated in any ALMP programme after this quarter is rather low.
It is approximately 5% after 12, 7% after 18 and around 10% after 24 months.
8For details on this pre-matching approach and the construction of the data see Caliendo, Steiner, and Baumgartner
(2005).
11Table 3: Selected Descriptives and Results of t-Tests
Men Women
NP SUS BA NP SUS BA
Mean Mean Mean p1 Mean Mean Mean p1
Variable SD SD SD p2 SD SD SD p2
Number of observations 1,448 811 1,207 848 704 378
Qualiﬁcational Variables
School Degree
No Degree 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.47
(0.14) (0.19) (0.12) 0.22 (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 0.36
Upper Secondary Schooling 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.04
(0.43) (0.38) (0.44) 0.16 (0.47) (0.44) (0.49) 0.01
Job Qualiﬁcation
High-Qualiﬁed 0.20 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.01
(0.40) (0.32) (0.42) 0.01 (0.41) (0.37) (0.47) 0.00
Unskilled 0.18 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.02
(0.38) (0.44) (0.35) 0.02 (0.36) (0.40) (0.27) 0.00
Labour Market History
Previous Unemployment Duration
< 3 months 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.00 0.24 0.34 0.61 0.00
(0.42) (0.46) (0.47) 0.00 (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) 0.00
> 12 months 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.24
(0.38) (0.41) (0.33) 0.00 (0.39) (0.37) (0.32) 0.00
No. of months in employment in 2002 6.69 5.52 7.79 0.00 6.35 6.02 7.65 0.20
(5.03) (4.93) (4.66) 0.00 (5.15) (5.04) (4.73) 0.00
Avgerage daily earnings in 2002 (in e) 46.02 27.39 64.07 0.00 30.75 22.25 50.12 0.00
(43.85) (29.69) (47.77) 0.00 (34.27) (25.13) (42.69) 0.00
Daily Unemployment Transfer (in e) 31.92 23.33 38.82 0.00 21.53 17.25 29.76 0.00
(14.03) (10.99) (14.97) 0.00 (11.45) (8.97) (13.16) 0.00
Remaining Time of UB (in months) 6.32 4.72 7.31 0.00 5.57 5.02 6.83 0.07
(6.34) (5.55) (6.24) 0.00 (5.99) (5.88) (6.07) 0.00
Note: All variables are measured one month before program start. Standard deviations are in parentheses. p-values
refer to t-tests of mean equality in the variables between participants in the start-up subsidy (SUS) and nonparticipants
(p1) and participants in bridging allowance (BA) and nonparticipants (p2).
A ﬁrst glance at the number of observations reveals clear gender diﬀerences in participation in
both programmes. Whereas the male-female ratio is about 3:1 for BA, it is nearly 1:1 for the SUS.
Further diﬀerences arise when looking at qualiﬁcations. Comparing the participants’ qualiﬁcations
either by highest school-leaving degree or the variable ‘job qualiﬁcations’, an assessment by the
placement oﬃcer in the local labour oﬃce, we see that BA participants are more highly qualiﬁed.
For example, the share of individuals who had completed upper secondary schooling is quite high
for participants in BA (26% of men / 40% of women) and rather low for participants in SUS (18%
of men / 27% of women). Job qualiﬁcations show a similar picture. Here, 24% of the male and 33%
of the female participants in BA are ranked as highly qualiﬁed, whereas this is only true for 12%
(17%) of the male (female) participants in SUS.
Based on that, it is hardly surprising that participants in BA programmes also have a more
favourable labour market history. Not only were they less frequently found among the long-term
unemployed before starting a programme; they also had higher and longer claims for unemployment
beneﬁts. Diﬀerences are substantial: for example, male BA recipients received unemployment
12support amounting to e38.80/day before starting a programme whereas SUS recipients received
only e23.30/day. It is also worth mentioning that the remaining period of beneﬁt entitlement
diﬀered signiﬁcantly between the two groups (approximately seven months for BA recipients and
ﬁve for SUS recipients).
Given the relatively stable participant structure in the BA programme since the introduction of
the SUS, one can argue that the SUS attracts a diﬀerent ‘clientele’ for self-employment. In general
it can be stated that participants in SUS are less qualiﬁed (when compared to BA participants),
and that this programme is frequently used by women. We will discuss the available variables in
more detail in the next section, where we also discuss the validity of the CIA.
5.2 Validity of the CIA
The CIA is in general a very strong assumption and the applicability of the matching estimator
depends crucially on its plausibility. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) argue that the plausibil-
ity of such an assumption should always be discussed on a case-by-case basis. Only variables that
inﬂuence the participation decision and the outcome variable simultaneously should be included
in the matching procedure. Hence, economic theory, a sound knowledge of previous research, and
information about the institutional setting should guide the researcher in specifying the model (see,
e.g., Smith and Todd, 2005 or Sianesi, 2004). Both economic theory and previous empirical ﬁndings
highlight the importance of socio-demographic and qualiﬁcational variables. Regarding the ﬁrst
category we can use variables such as age, marital status, number of children, nationality (German
or foreigner), and health restrictions. Additionally, we also use information whether individuals
want to work full-time or part-time, and hence we might be able to approximate the labour market
ﬂexibility of these individuals.
A second class of variables (qualiﬁcation variables) refers to the human capital of the individ-
ual, which is also a crucially important determinant of labour market prospects. The attributes
available are school degree, job qualiﬁcation, and work experience. Furthermore, as pointed out by
Heckman and Smith (1999), unemployment dynamics and labour market history play a major role
in driving outcomes and programme participation. Hence, we use career variables describing the
individual’s labour market history. The available data in this regard is quite extensive. We have
a nearly complete seven-year labour market history including information about the months spent
in employment or unemployment. Additionally we know the daily earnings from employment and
the amount of daily unemployment beneﬁts. Furthermore, we can draw on the duration of the last
unemployment spell, the number of (unsuccessful) placement propositions, the employment status
before unemployment, and the previous profession.
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) also emphasise the importance of drawing treat-
ment and comparison groups from the same local labour market and giving them the same question-
naire. Since we use administrative data from the same sources for participants and nonparticipants,
the latter point is not a problem in our data. To account for the situation on the local labour
market, we use a classiﬁcation of similar and comparable labour oﬃce districts derived by the FEA.
13Nine diﬀerent clusters can be identiﬁed for West Germany.9
Finally, the institutional structure and the selection process into programmes provide further
guidance in selecting the relevant variables. As we have seen from the discussion in Section 2,
the two programmes diﬀer among other things in the size of the subsidy. Whereas the SUS is
a lump sum, the BA depends on the amount of the unemployment beneﬁts. Hence, we include
the daily unemployment transfer payment before the start of the programme as an explanatory
variable. In contrast to many other studies we are also able to include the remaining duration of
unemployment beneﬁts, which probably plays a determining role in these individuals’ decision.10
Based on this exhaustive data, we argue that the CIA holds in our application. However, we also
test the sensitivity of the results with respect to time-invariant unobserved diﬀerences between
participants and nonparticipants.
5.3 Estimation of the Propensity Score and Common Support
Since the choice probabilities are not known a priori, we have to replace them with an estimate. To
do so, we estimate binary conditional probabilities for both programmes versus nonparticipation.
Since we estimate the eﬀects separately for men and women, we are left with four logit estimations.
The results can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. To ensure the comparability between the
estimates we choose the same covariates for each combination and both genders. We do not interpret
the results of the propensity score estimation, since we only use this estimation to reduce the
dimensionality problem. One has to remember that the group of participants and nonparticipants
are already quite similar due to the construction of the data (see Section 5).
The distribution of the propensity score is depicted in Figure 1. A visual analysis already suggests
that the overlap between the group of participants and nonparticipants is suﬃcient in general.
Nevertheless, there are some parts of the distribution (starting approximately at a propensity score
value of 0.7) where the mass of comparison individuals is quite thin. This is especially true for female
participants in BA. However, by using the usual ‘Minmax’ criterion, where treated individuals are
excluded from the sample whose propensity score lies above the highest propensity score in the
comparison group, only 13 individuals are dropped overall.11
5.4 Matching Details
Several matching procedures have been suggested in the literature, such as nearest-neighbour or
kernel matching.12 To introduce them, a more general notation is needed: let I0, and I1 denote the
9This classiﬁcation was undertaken by a project group of the FEA (Blien et al., 2004) whose aim was to enhance the
comparability of the labour oﬃce districts for a more eﬃcient allocation of funds. It categorises the 181 German labour
oﬃce districts into twelve comparable clusters. The comparability of the labour oﬃce districts is built upon several
labour market characteristics, where the most important criteria are the underemployment rate and the corrected
population density.
10Lechner and Wunsch (2006) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of ALMP (excluding start-up subsidies) in East Germany
using a very similar set of variables.
11We also test the sensitivity of the results with respect to more strict imposition of the common support requirement,
e.g., by dropping 5%(10%) of the individuals where the overlap between participants and nonparticipants is especially
low. It turns out that the results are not sensitive.
12See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), Smith and Todd (2005), and Imbens (2004) for overviews.Figure 1: Distribution of the Propensity Scores – Common Support1
Men Women
Note: Propensity score is estimated according to the speciﬁcation in Table A.2. Participants are depicted in the upper
half, nonparticipants in the lower half of each ﬁgure.
set of indices for nonparticipants and participants. We estimate the eﬀect of treatment for each
treated observation i ∈ I1 in the treatment group by contrasting her outcome with treatment with












where N0 is the number of observations in the control group I0 and N1 is the number of observations
in the treatment group I1. Matching estimators diﬀer in the weights attached to the members of
the comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998), where WN0(i,j) is the weight
placed on the j-th individual from the comparison group in constructing the counterfactual for the
i-th individual of the treatment group. The weights always satisfy
P
j WN0(i,j) = 1,∀i, that is, the
total weight of all controls sums up to one for each treated individual. Matching estimators diﬀer
in how the neighbourhood is deﬁned and the weights are constructed, e.g., with nearest-neighbour
matching, only the closest neighbour is used to construct the counterfactual outcome. Kernel
matching (KM), on the other hand, is a non-parametric matching estimator that uses (nearly)
all units in the control group to construct a match for each programme participant. One major
15advantage of these approaches is the lower variance which is achieved because more information
is used for constructing counterfactual outcomes. Since our treatment and comparison groups are
rather small, we will focus now and in the later empirical application on this method.13
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) derive the asymptotic distribution of these estimators and
show that bootstrapping is valid to draw inference for this matching method. This is an additional
advantage since it allows us to circumvent the issues raised by Abadie and Imbens (2006), pointing
out that bootstrap methods are invalid for NN matching. It is worth noting that if weights from
a symmetric, nonnegative, unimodal kernel are used, the average places higher weight on persons
close in terms of Pi and lower weight on more distant observations. Kernel matching sets Ai = I0






where Gik = G[(Pi − Pk)/h] is a kernel that downweights distant observations from Pi and h is
a bandwidth parameter (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998).14 Before applying kernel
matching, assumptions have to be made regarding the choice of the kernel function and the band-
width parameter h. The choice of the kernel appears to be relatively unimportant in practice (see,
e.g., DiNardo and Tobias (2001) or Jones, Marron, and Sheather (1996)).
What is seen as more important in the non-parametric literature is the choice of the bandwidth
parameter h. Silverman (1986) and Pagan and Ullah (1999) note that there is little to choose
between various kernel functions, whereas results depend more on h with the following trade-oﬀ
arising: high values of h yield a smoother estimated density function, producing a better ﬁt and a
decreasing variance between the estimated and the true underlying density function. On the other
hand, underlying features may be smoothed away by a large h, leading to a biased estimate. The
choice of h is therefore a compromise between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the
true density function. Instead of using a ‘rule of thumb’ as proposed by Silverman (1986), we use
cross-validation (CV) as suggested in Black and Smith (2004) and Galdo (2005) to choose h. CV
methods are based on the principle of optimizing the out-of-sample predictive ability of the selected
estimator. Here, we use a leave-one-out CV principle that drops the jth unit in the comparison
group and forms the counterfactual b Y0j for that unit using the N0 − 1 observations left in the
comparison group (Stone, 1974). Repeating the process for all comparison units, and given the fact
that each estimation does not include the jth unit, this represents an out-of-sample forecast. Then,
the bandwidth is chosen which minimises the mean square error (Galdo, 2005). More details and
most importantly, the chosen bandwidth parameters can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
We will use these bandwidth parameters for the further empirical analysis.15
13However, we will also show that our results are not sensitive to the matching algorithm chosen.
14h satisﬁes limN0→∞ h = 0. See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for precise conditions on the rate of conver-
gence needed for consistency and asymptotic normality of the kernel matching estimator.
15Estimations are done using the PSMATCH2 Stata ado-package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
165.5 Matching Quality
To test if the matching procedure is able to balance all the covariates we ran a standardised diﬀer-
ence (SD) test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This is a suitable indicator to assess the distance in
marginal distributions of the W-variables. For each covariate W it is deﬁned as the diﬀerence of
sample means in the treated and matched control subsamples as a percentage of the square root of
the average of sample variances in both groups. This is a common approach used in many evalua-
tion studies, including those by Lechner (1999), Sianesi (2004) and Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen
(2005). Table 4 shows the mean standardised diﬀerence (MSD), i.e., the mean of the SD over all
covariates before and after the matching took place.
Table 4: Matching Quality — Some Indicators
Variable Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
MSD - Before Matching 13.049 7.780 12.658 18.577
MSD - After Matching 1.375 2.133 1.303 2.612
R2 - Before Matching 0.127 0.094 0.082 0.150
R2 - After Matching 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008
χ2 - Before Matching 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
χ2 - After Matching 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Participants oﬀ support 1 7 4 1
Note: Mean standardised diﬀerence (MSD) has been calculated as an
unweighted average of the standardised diﬀerence of all covariates.
Standardised diﬀerence before matching calculated as: 100 · (W 1 −
W 0)/{
p
(V1(W) + V0(W))/2} and standardised diﬀerence after match-
ing calculated as: 100 · (W 1M − W 0M)/{
p
(V1(W) + V0(W))/2}.
It can be seen that the MSD before matching lies between 7.8% for women and 13.0% for men
in SUS and even between 12.7% (men) and 18.6% (women) in BA. The matching procedure is able
to balance the distribution of the covariates very well, especially for men, where the MSD after
matching lies around 1.3%. For women in SUS, the MSD after matching is 2.1%; for women in BA
it is 2.6%. In general, it is not suﬃcient to look at the MSD if one wants to judge the quality of the
matching procedure. Instead a careful look at the SD for each variable is necessary, which, in our
case, showed very satisfying results.16
Additionally Sianesi (2004) suggests re-estimating the propensity score on the matched sample
(i.e., on the participants and matched nonparticipants) and comparing the pseudo-R2’s before and
after matching. After matching there should be no systematic diﬀerences in the distribution of
the covariates between the two groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly
low. As the results from Table 4 show, this is true for our estimation. The results of the F-
tests point in the same direction, indicating a joint signiﬁcance of all regressors before, but not after
matching. Overall, these are satisfying results and show that the matching procedure was successful
16Detailed results are available on request by the authors. The highest SD after matching in a single variable lies
at 4.0% for men in SUS and 4.0% for men in BA. For women matching quality is slightly worse and the highest SD
after matching lies around 7.5% for women in SUS and 7.4% for women in BA.
17in balancing the covariates between treated individuals and members from the comparison group.
Hence, we move on to the presentation of the results.
6 Results
The presentation of the results will be split in two parts. First we discuss the eﬀectiveness of the
two programmes in relation to nonparticipation. Three potential outcome variables are of crucial
interest here. First, we want to know if programme participation lowers the risk of returning
to unemployment. To this end, we construct a variable that treats registered unemployment as a
failure and all possible other states as a success (outcome variable A). Since avoiding unemployment
is one of the two major goals of German ALMP, this allows us to compare the eﬀectiveness of the
programmes in reaching this goal. A second aim is integration into regular, stable employment.
Hence, we construct a second outcome variable which treats ongoing self-employment and regular
paid employment as a success (outcome variable B). The combination of these two labour market
states is important for comparing outcomes between participants in either of the two programmes
(who are mainly self-employed at the time of the interview) and nonparticipants (who are more
likely in regular employment). Finally, we also assess the eﬀects of the programmes on the personal
income of participants. In the second step, we use our results on eﬀectiveness to conduct a cost-
beneﬁt analysis. The question to be answered here is whether the FEA saved money by assigning
individuals to either of the two programmes (in contrast to providing continued unemployment
support).
6.1 Eﬀectiveness in Terms of Employment Status and Income
Eﬀects on the Employment Status over Time: Figure 2 presents the treatment eﬀects over
time, where the upper panel relates to outcome variable A (not unemployed) and the lower part
to outcome variable B (self-employed or in regular employment). Eﬀects for men (women) are
depicted on the left (right) side of each row. Rows 1 and 3 show the eﬀects of participating in SUS
vs. nonparticipation, whereas rows 2 and 4 show the eﬀects of BA (vs. nonparticipation).
Eﬀects start in the ﬁrst month after the treatment has begun. Before starting the interpretation
one has to note the following: a look at both ﬁgures shows a strong positive eﬀect at the beginning
of our observation period. This can be seen as a ‘positive locking-in eﬀect’. Whereas a locking-in
eﬀect usually corresponds to a negative eﬀect during participation in a programme—for example,
vocational training—the ﬁndings for our programmes are the opposite. Both participants and
nonparticipants are unemployed in the month before the treatment starts, then participants join
the programme and change immediately to the ‘hoped-for’ state. That is, they leave unemployment
and become self-employed, which is viewed as a success for both outcome variables. Hence, one
should not overemphasise this large eﬀect at the start of the self-employment spell. BA runs out
after six months, and a reasonable interpretation should start there. Clearly, for the three-year-
long SUS, the problem is that participants may receive aid during the complete observation period,
18interfering with interpretation. However, after 12 months, the transfer payment is reduced from
e600 to e360 and after 24 months it is reduced further to e240. Since this reduced payment is
hardly suﬃcient to cover social security contributions, it gives us us an initial idea of the success of
the newly self-employed.
Let us start the discussion with the ﬁrst outcome variable, that is, the probability of not being
unemployed. In the ﬁrst months after treatment starts, we have very high positive eﬀects for both
programmes, lying well above 60 percentage points, irrespective of programme and gender. This
means, for example, that the unemployment probability of participants in SUS or BA is about 60
percentage points lower than the unemployment probability of nonparticipants. Clearly, results at
that point have to be interpreted with care, since both programmes are still ongoing. The eﬀects
show a negative time trend, where the paths of the programmes are very similar up to month six.
After that, the transfer payment for participants in BA terminates and the eﬀects plunge. The
downward trend continues but the rate of decrease is much lower. At the end of our observation
period, that is, 28 months after programmes have started, we get an eﬀect of 16.8 percentage points
for male and 16.8 percentage points for female participants in BA. If we look at the eﬀect of SUS
versus nonparticipation, the downward trend is much smoother, spiking somewhat in month 12, but
decreasing relatively constantly to an eﬀect of 28.2 percentage points for males and 17.6 percentage
points for females in month 28.17
Looking at the lower part of Figure 2 shows a similar pattern but on a higher level. Remember
that this is the eﬀect for being in regular or self-employment. Eﬀects already start at a much higher
level, around 80 percentage points, and remain higher throughout the whole observation period. In
t+28 we have a positive eﬀect for males which lies at 36.8 percentage points for participants in SUS
and 21.4 percentage points for participants in BA. Even more extreme diﬀerences can be found for
women, where the eﬀect for SUS lies at 44.6 percentage points and 39.6 percentage points for BA.
This is a strong indication that both programmes are not only eﬀective in avoiding unemployment
but that they also give individuals much higher chances of remaining employed (either in paid or
self-employment). The strong diﬀerences in both outcome variables can be explained by the fact
that outcome variable A only treats registered unemployment as a failure. When individuals retreat
from the labour market—and this might be especially relevant for women—they are not counted as
a failure. Hence, the second outcome variable, only treating individuals as a success if they are in
employment, has more explanatory power.
Cumulated Eﬀects: Table 5 contains the cumulative eﬀects over time, i.e., the cumulative
monthly eﬀects over the observation period. For the outcome variable ‘not unemployed’ this shows
the diﬀerence in months spent in unemployment between participants and nonparticipants. It can
be seen that male participants in SUS spend roughly 12.2 months less in unemployment than non-
17The dip in the eﬀects, especially for men, between months 16 and 20, is caused by a change in the interview
information. Individuals were interviewed twice, in 2005 and 2006. Months 16 to 20 might involve a time overlap
between the ﬁrst and second interview and might be prone to recall errors. Hence, information for these months should
be interpreted with care. For the overall interpretation, especially when moving towards the end of the observation
period, this should not pose any problems.
19Figure 2: Treatment Eﬀects over Time
Men Women
Outcome Variable A: Not Unemployed
Outcome variable B: Employed or Self-Employed
Note: Estimations are based on kernel matching as described in Section 5.4. Bootstrapped
standard errors are based on 200 replications.
20participants. For female participants in SUS the eﬀect is approximately 9.7 months. The cumulative
eﬀect for participants in BA is slightly lower, at 8.6 months for men and 9.1 months for women.
We have already discussed that the eﬀects for the outcome variable ‘self-employment or paid em-
ployment’ are even higher, which is also reﬂected by the cumulative eﬀects of around 14.7 (16.9)
months for men (women) in SUS and 10.2 (14.8) months for men (women) in BA.
Table 5: Cumulated Eﬀects - Matching and Conditional DiD
Start-Up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
Outcome Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e
Outcome Variable A: Not Unemployed (in months)
Matching 12.19 (0.418) 9.72 (0.493) 8.55 (0.362) 9.13 (0.491)
DiD-1 11.82 (0.792) 9.26 (0.768) 8.46 (0.403) 6.79 (0.742)
DiD-2 11.97 (0.503) 9.80 (0.611) 8.63 (0.372) 7.96 (0.521)
DiD-3 12.03 (0.488) 9.18 (0.631) 8.39 (0.358) 7.96 (0.520)
Outcome Variable B: Employed or Self-Employed (in months)
Matching 14.66 (0.474) 16.87 (0.496) 10.17 (0.382) 14.76 (0.505)
DiD-1 14.61 (0.944) 15.85 (1.332) 9.83 (0.930) 6.75 (1.347)
DiD-2 14.50 (0.636) 16.63 (0.764) 10.17 (0.599) 11.67 (0.917)
DiD-3 14.77 (0.791) 16.09 (0.906) 9.83 (0.683) 9.83 (1.012)
Note: Matching estimates are based on kernel matching as discussed in Section 5.4.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 200 bootstrap replications.
Reference level for DiD 1: Total month not spend in unemployment (outcome variable
A) and spend in regular employment (outcome variable B) between 1997 and 2002.
Reference level for DiD 2: Same as DiD-1, but for the time period 2000-2002.
Reference level for DiD 3: Same as DiD-1, but for the time period 1997-1999.
As outlined in Section 4.3 we also tested the sensitivity of our results with respect to time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity by using a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. Before
using such an approach, one has to determine the reference level for the before/after diﬀerence. We
choose three diﬀerent time periods for the comparison. In the ﬁrst approach we use the time period
from 1997 to 2002, that is, the six-year employment history before entering the programme. For
the ﬁrst outcome variable, we sum the months not spent in unemployment, whereas for the second,
we sum the months spent in paid employment. Additionally, we restrict the reference period to the
latest three years, that is, the time period 2000-2002, and the earliest three years, that is, the time
period 1997-1999.
Looking at the table, we see that the results are remarkably stable. For example, the eﬀect
on outcome variable B for men in SUS was 14.66 months with the matching approach and varies
between 14.50 and 14.77 months with the CDID approaches. For women in SUS and men in BA the
variation is slightly higher, but still negligible. This shows that additionally controlling for possible
unobserved diﬀerences between participants and nonparticipants did not add much information for
our estimates. This can be seen as evidence of the validity of the CIA in our context. Results are less
favourable when looking at the smallest group under observation, that is, women in BA. Here the
matching estimates are 9.13 months (not unemployed) and 14.76 months (regular or self-employed)
21respectively. The CDID results, however, vary from 6.8 to 8.0 in the ﬁrst and 6.8 and 11.7 in the
second case. This indicates that unobservable diﬀerences between the group of female participants
in BA and nonparticipants remain even after matching. Given the fact that the CDID estimates
are smaller than the matching estimates, one could argue that there are unobserved factors that
drive not only the participation probability but also labour market outcomes. Hence, we have to
treat these eﬀects with caution.
Eﬀects on the Personal Income: After having established that participants in both pro-
grammes are more likely to be employed and less likely to be unemployed than nonparticipants,
we now investigate whether participants also earn more money. The questionnaire from Jan-
uary/February 2006 contained several questions related to individuals’ personal income which allow
us to generate two income-related outcome variables. The most relevant one is monthly income from
self-employment or paid employment. This is the labour income that we are mainly interested in
and that will be the focus of the analysis. However, since it is often argued that diﬀerences between
(low) labour income and unemployment beneﬁts are especially low in Germany, we will also look
at the total personal income of individuals, that is, including support such as unemployment beneﬁts.
Table 6: Eﬀects on Monthly Income - Matching and Conditional DiD
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
Outcome Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e
Eﬀect on Monthly Income from Self-Employment/Regular Employment (in e)
Matching 596.27 (68.00) 298.96 (66.77) 770.69 (96.22) 975.80 (115.19)
DiD 1 601.44 (67.04) 295.57 (67.97) 768.72 (84.13) 738.01 (108.72)
DiD 2 586.95 (76.58) 289.80 (65.28) 742.37 (95.54) 429.69 (113.86)
DiD 3 586.76 (72.22) 316.32 (78.26) 770.97 (96.72) 510.58 (117.38)
Eﬀect on Total Monthly Income (in e)
Matching 465.99 (64.36) 237.46 (66.58) 639.23 (82.20) 950.87 (111.04)
DiD 1 471.17 (66.83) 234.07 (68.73) 637.26 (82.18) 713.08 (109.23)
DiD 2 456.67 (61.83) 228.29 (65.19) 610.90 (91.14) 404.76 (114.74)
DiD 3 456.48 (72.48) 254.81 (71.09) 639.51 (94.35) 485.65 (125.22)
Note: Matching estimates are based on kernel matching as discussed in Section 5.4. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are based on 200 bootstrap replications.
Reference level for DiD 1: Unemployment Beneﬁt before programme start.
Reference level for DiD 2: Average monthly income in 2002.
Reference level for DiD 3: Average monthly income from regular employment in 2002.
Table 6 contains the results for both outcome variables. Once again, we ﬁrst present the results
from matching estimates before presenting CDID results. For the DID procedure we use three
reference levels: 1) The monthly unemployment beneﬁts before the programme started, 2) the
average monthly income in 2002 and 3) the average monthly income from regular employment in
2002. It is quite striking that all participants have signiﬁcantly higher incomes than nonparticipants
for both possible outcome variables. The upper half of Table 6 reveals that male participants in SUS
earn around e600 per month more than their counterparts in the comparison group. Once again, the
22CDID does not add much information to the matching estimates since all estimates range between
e586 and e601. For female participants, the eﬀect is much lower—between e290 and e316—but
still signiﬁcant. The eﬀects for the participants in BA is even higher. Male participants earn about
e770 more per month. For females, we once again have the problem that matching and CDID
results diﬀer signiﬁcantly, making it hard to draw relevant policy conclusions.
Hence, we can conclude that participating in either of the two programmes has helped individuals
to earn more money at the end of our observation period. This stays true even if we use the total
personal income of individuals as an outcome variable, where we additionally take unemployment
beneﬁts and other government transfers into account.
6.2 Eﬃciency Analysis
So far, we have analysed the eﬀectiveness of both programmes with respect to employment status
and personal income. We have concluded that both programmes are eﬀective, i.e., they increase both
the probability of employment and income, and decrease the probability of unemployment. Whereas
most of the evaluation studies of ALMP stop at that point, as mentioned above, we want to take
the analysis a step further. Having established that participation is beneﬁcial for participants, we
now analyse whether the programme is beneﬁcial for the provider, that is, the Federal Employment
Agency. To do so, we conduct a basic four-step cost-beneﬁt analysis, which we will explain brieﬂy:
1. Cumulated Eﬀects: We use the cumulative eﬀects for the whole observation period and
the outcome variable ‘not unemployed’ as a starting point. Let CE denote the cumulative
eﬀect, that is, the number of months less that a participant spends in unemployment than a
nonparticipant.
2. Average Savings per Participant in Months: If we think about the money the FEA
saved by placing individuals in these programmes, we have to take into account the remaining
period of beneﬁt entitlement (RBE). Clearly, if the cumulative eﬀect is, for instance, six
months for a certain group, but the RBE for the same group is only four months, the FEA
only saves four unemployment months. Hence, we use the following decision rule to determine
the average saving (AS) in unemployment months:
AS = CE if CE ≤ RBE
= RBE if CE > RBE
3. Reduced Spending: To put a monetary value on the savings of the FEA, we multiply AS
by the average level of unemployment beneﬁts in the group of treated individuals (UB). Note
that we add 70% on top of this value, since the FEA also covers social security contributions
of individuals, which amount to approximately 70%.
4. Monetary Eﬃciency: Finally, to get the monetary eﬃciency we contrast AS with the direct
costs of the programmes. For the SUS, these costs are ﬁxed (e600/month in the ﬁrst year, etc.)
and depend only on the number of months an individual stays in self-employment. Hence,
23they can be directly calculated from the number of months spent in self-employment. For BA
they depend on the individual UB in the participants’ group and are estimated accordingly.
Several things have to be noted about our approach. First of all, we only consider direct costs
and beneﬁts associated with the programmes. The direct costs only include programme costs that
arise through payment of subsidies to SUS or BA participants. We do not consider any adminis-
trative costs that arise, e.g., through counseling services provided by the local employment oﬃce
to the unemployed. If these costs are higher (lower) for participants than for nonparticipants, our
approach over-(under)estimates the monetary eﬃciency. On the beneﬁt side, we only consider the
reductions in spending achieved through discontinuation of participants’ unemployment beneﬁts. It
should be clear that unemployed individuals in Germany receive means-tested beneﬁts after their
entitlement to UB expires. These payments are usually not borne by the FEA but by other author-
ities. Hence, our approach underestimates the monetary eﬃciency. Finally, we also do not take into
account the additional tax revenues of the entrepreneurs’ businesses or the fact that some of these
businesses might generate additional jobs. Clearly, these assumptions are necessary to facilitate
our estimation of the direct costs and beneﬁts, but a more thorough CBA should take these points
into account. For the moment, we are willing to make these simplifying assumptions to get a ﬁrst
impression of the monetary eﬃciency of both programmes.
Table 7: Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis - Results
Variable Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
Cumulated Treatment Eﬀect (in months) 12.19 9.72 8.55 9.13
Unemployment Beneﬁts
Remaining Time (in months) 4.60 4.94 7.24 6.74
Monthly Level (in e) 707.30 527.88 1,176.37 904.99
Direct Costs of the Treatment (in e) 11,285.58 11,591.54 11,955.71 9,161.89
Monetary Eﬃciency -5,759.02 -7,155.53 2,524.19 1,203.75
(94.30) (77.71) (107.10) (254.40)
Note: Standard errors of the monetary eﬃciency (in parentheses) are based on 200 bootstrap
replications.
Table 7 contains the results and more information on each of the four steps. The ﬁrst line
replicates the results from Table 5 showing the cumulative treatment eﬀects in months. Rows
two and three contain the remaining time of beneﬁt entitlement (in months) and the monthly
unemployment beneﬁts (in euros). Two things should be noted immediately. First, participants
in BA have on average much more time remaining in which they are entitled to unemployment
beneﬁts. Whereas this ﬁgure is below ﬁve months for men and women in SUS, male participants
in BA have a remaining 7.2 months and female participants 6.7 months. Second, the level of UB
is much higher for BA participants, reaching e1,171 per month for males and e900 per month for
females. Participants in the SUS are entitled to unemployment beneﬁts of e708 (men) and e530
(women). The ﬁnal ingredient in the cost-beneﬁt analysis are the direct costs of participation. Since
the SUS subsidy does not depend on individual characteristics, costs are nearly the same for both
24genders, amounting to e11,300 for men and e11,600 for women. The diﬀerence can be explained
by the fact that a slightly higher proportion of female participants stays in self-employment in
our observation period. For the BA, on the other hand, costs depend directly on the individuals’
unemployment beneﬁts and are therefore higher for men (e11,900) than for women (e9,100).
Based on that, we get a clearly negative monetary eﬃciency for participants in SUS. Even
though the cumulative eﬀects are quite high for this group, the eﬀect is dominated by the low
remaining time of beneﬁt entitlement and the relatively low level of beneﬁts they would receive.
For example, the direct costs for the FEA for female participants in SUS would have been only
e4,500 (e530 plus 70% to cover social security per month for ﬁve months) had they not entered
the programme. Compared with the direct costs of the programme, this amounts to a monetary
eﬃciency of -e7,148. Since men in SUS have a higher beneﬁt level, i.e., would incur higher costs on
the FEA, the monetary eﬃciency is slightly better, but still negative at -e5,750. For participants
in BA, however, we get a positive monetary eﬃciency of e2,490 for men and e1,178 for women.
These ﬁndings clearly show that BA support to unemployed people starting their own busi-
ness has not only helped them to enhance their employment status and earn more income (when
compared to nonparticipants), but has also saved the FEA money, decreasing its spending on un-
employment beneﬁts. For the SUS, our ﬁndings are not as encouraging. We have to keep in mind
that the end of our observation period is 28 months after inception of the programmes. Hence, par-
ticipants who continue in self-employment and do not earn more than e25,000 per year will receive
further support of e240 for eight months. Clearly, this adds to the direct programme costs, but
will not aﬀect the savings of the FEA, resulting in even worse estimates for the monetary eﬃciency
of SUS.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to evaluate the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of two active labour
market programmes in Germany designed to encourage unemployed people to become entrepreneurs.
These programmes have the potential not only to combat Germany’s problem of persistently high
unemployment, but also to increase its notoriously low self-employment rate. Our analysis is based
on a dataset that combines administrative with survey data and allows us to follow the employment
paths of individuals for up to 28 months after programmes have started. For the ﬁrst programme
under consideration—the bridging allowance—we observed participants for 22 months after the
programme ended. However, participants in the second programme—the start-up subsidy—are in
their third year of participation at the end of our observation period, and most likely will still receive
further support (although at a reduced rate). Therefore, the results for SUS have to be treated as
preliminary.
We have evaluated the eﬀectiveness of both programmes relative to nonparticipation. To this
end we used a kernel matching estimator and a conditional diﬀerence-and-diﬀerences estimator.
Three outcome variables were of major interest. The ﬁrst was ‘not unemployed’, corresponding to
one of the main aims of the FEA. The second one combines the two possible labour market states
25‘in self-employment’ and ‘in paid employment’ into one success criterion. The results indicate that
both programmes are successful: at the end of our observation period, the unemployment rate of
participants in BA was approximately 17 percentage points lower than that of nonparticipants, and
for participants in SUS, around 18 percentage points lower for women and as much as 29 percentage
points lower for men. Additionally, both the probability of being in self-employment and/or paid
employment and the personal income are signiﬁcantly higher for participants.
Based on the results of the eﬀectiveness analysis we also conducted a basic cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Our results show that BA funding of individuals starting self-employment has not only helped them
to enhance their employment status and earn more income (when compared to nonparticipants),
but has also saved the FEA money by reducing its spending on unemployment beneﬁts. For the
SUS, the ﬁndings are not as encouraging, and result in a negative monetary eﬃciency.
Having said that, we can conclude that this is one of the ﬁrst studies that allows inferences to
be drawn about the eﬀects of the start-up programmes that comprise part of Germany’s ALMP.
In contrast to other German ALMP programmes that have been evaluated recently (including job
creation schemes and vocational training programmes), we ﬁnd considerable positive eﬀects for these
two programmes. Hence, programmes aimed at turning the unemployed into entrepreneurs may be
among the most promising for active labour market policy, both in Germany and elsewhere.
To allow more precise policy recommendations, further research is needed. First of all, the
relative eﬀects of both programmes should be estimated, which would allow their respective designs
to be judged, as well as their suitability for diﬀerent target groups. Additionally, it would be of
interest to look at the development of the start-ups in terms of turnover and number of jobs directly
created. Such an investigation would also enable a more extensive cost-beneﬁt analysis taking not
only the direct costs and beneﬁts but also the indirect ones into account.
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Table A.1: Selected Descriptive Statisticsa
Males Females
ExGZ UEG NT ExGZ UEG NT
Number of observations 811 1207 1448 704 378 848
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age category
18-24 0.084 0.035 0.068 0.037 0.032 0.051
25-29 0.155 0.100 0.115 0.094 0.079 0.074
30-34 0.181 0.147 0.146 0.165 0.164 0.165
35-39 0.158 0.234 0.209 0.229 0.265 0.242
40-44 0.169 0.205 0.186 0.212 0.209 0.199
45-49 0.112 0.148 0.148 0.141 0.116 0.152
50-64 0.141 0.131 0.129 0.124 0.135 0.117
Family status
Married 0.452 0.631 0.543 0.582 0.432 0.547
Children
No children 0.731 0.613 0.675 0.479 0.701 0.538
One child 0.136 0.153 0.136 0.253 0.180 0.213
Two or more children 0.133 0.234 0.189 0.268 0.119 0.249
Health restrictions
Yes 0.089 0.040 0.063 0.044 0.034 0.050
Nationality
Non-German 0.338 0.286 0.277 0.295 0.241 0.276
Desired working time
Full time 0.979 0.993 0.985 0.550 0.833 0.621
Qualiﬁcation variables
School degree
No degree 0.036 0.015 0.021 0.007 0.005 0.011
Lower secondary schooling 0.439 0.309 0.367 0.303 0.159 0.241
Middle secondary schooling 0.237 0.239 0.231 0.335 0.278 0.320
Specialised upper sec. schooling 0.111 0.175 0.142 0.084 0.161 0.110
Upper secondary schooling 0.178 0.263 0.239 0.271 0.397 0.320
Job qualiﬁcation
Tertiary education 0.117 0.235 0.196 0.168 0.333 0.218
Technical college education 0.064 0.118 0.089 0.033 0.040 0.037
Skilled workers 0.552 0.503 0.537 0.601 0.545 0.591
Unskilled workers 0.267 0.143 0.178 0.199 0.082 0.153
Occupational group (in previous profession)
Agriculture 0.039 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.009
Manufacturing 0.340 0.251 0.289 0.081 0.048 0.061
Technical 0.042 0.152 0.102 0.053 0.058 0.046
Services 0.502 0.548 0.517 0.700 0.828 0.723
Others 0.076 0.036 0.078 0.155 0.061 0.160
Labour market history
Duration of last unemployment
< 3 months 0.300 0.321 0.236 0.341 0.325 0.241
3 months - < 6 months 0.207 0.239 0.265 0.156 0.206 0.262
6 months - < 1 year 0.284 0.314 0.326 0.344 0.352 0.316
1 year - < 2 years 0.152 0.112 0.144 0.125 0.103 0.144
≥ 2 years 0.058 0.014 0.029 0.034 0.013 0.038
Work experiences (Yes) 0.827 0.870 0.856 0.857 0.836 0.869
Number of placement propositions 5.610 3.792 5.326 3.683 3.394 4.302
(9.210) (7.185) (7.565) (7.015) (6.230) (7.150)
Current daily unemployment transfer 23.329 38.815 31.919 17.252 29.758 21.531
(10.990) (14.973) (14.027) (8.967) (13.164) (11.450)
Remaining time of beneﬁt entitlement 4.716 7.314 6.318 5.018 6.828 5.571
(5.550) (6.238) (6.338) (5.879) (6.074) (5.993)
Continued on next page.
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Males Females
ExGZ UEG NT ExGZ UEG NT
Labour market history (ctd.)
Employment status before unemployment
Employment 0.596 0.774 0.736 0.570 0.730 0.678
Self-employment 0.056 0.025 0.039 0.050 0.034 0.029
School/Non-employed 0.110 0.069 0.074 0.077 0.069 0.055
Unemployability 0.080 0.046 0.052 0.075 0.040 0.054
Other but once employed 0.140 0.075 0.085 0.217 0.124 0.171
Others 0.019 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.003 0.012
Employment and earnings history
Months in regular employment
1996 (H2) 2.841 3.642 3.012 2.722 3.325 2.486
(2.685) (2.613) (2.690) (2.695) (2.692) (2.711)
1997 5.890 7.786 6.568 5.790 7.212 5.325
(5.300) (5.211) (5.427) (5.393) (5.377) (5.510)
1998 6.199 8.214 6.870 5.783 7.622 5.471
(5.322) (5.047) (5.372) (5.395) (5.122) (5.513)
1999 6.793 8.826 7.393 6.270 8.108 5.741
(5.153) (4.700) (5.139) (5.329) (4.970) (5.371)
2000 7.215 8.826 7.744 6.643 8.169 6.167
(5.063) (4.655) (5.078) (5.293) (4.896) (5.446)
2001 7.287 9.167 7.811 6.915 8.876 6.923
(4.949) (4.412) (5.014) (5.163) (4.528) (5.412)
2002 5.518 7.788 6.694 6.020 7.648 6.354
(4.929) (4.659) (5.032) (5.042) (4.730) (5.153)
2003 (H1) 1.063 1.451 1.294 1.101 1.431 1.269
(1.986) (2.157) (2.060) (2.032) (2.236) (2.070)
Months in unemployment
1996 (H2) 0.298 0.079 0.198 0.126 0.063 0.199
(0.960) (1.175) (0.612) (0.994) (0.765) (0.551)
1997 0.695 0.914 0.292 0.616 0.419 0.259
(2.430) (2.703) (1.608) (2.386) (1.956) (1.479)
1998 0.853 1.116 0.340 0.804 0.570 0.357
(2.546) (2.895) (1.592) (2.601) (2.153) (1.506)
1999 1.140 1.453 0.507 1.024 0.980 0.561
(2.816) (3.210) (1.850) (2.802) (2.764) (1.967)
2000 1.515 1.829 0.781 1.265 1.145 0.796
(3.193) (3.414) (2.240) (3.002) (2.787) (2.122)
2001 1.731 2.383 1.001 1.465 1.695 0.783
(3.288) (3.718) (2.472) (3.161) (3.254) (2.045)
2002 3.075 4.051 2.428 3.058 3.172 2.548
(3.980) (4.158) (3.401) (4.142) (3.878) (3.459)
2003 (H1) 3.756 3.925 3.627 3.724 3.766 3.680
(2.341) (2.356) (2.356) (2.381) (2.425) (2.405)
Daily earnings from regular employment
1996 (H2) 39.544 31.597 55.922 25.076 25.802 41.863
(43.600) (36.968) (49.005) (33.521) (32.215) (43.895)
1997 31.012 57.313 40.813 24.933 43.812 25.231
(35.994) (49.075) (42.962) (30.604) (43.832) (33.355)
1998 33.383 62.127 43.409 24.487 45.866 25.961
(36.529) (49.265) (43.859) (30.290) (43.380) (34.305)
1999 35.779 66.244 47.097 25.946 51.397 27.808
(35.955) (48.067) (43.705) (29.382) (45.119) (33.989)
2000 37.669 69.300 50.893 26.406 52.506 30.173
(35.712) (48.789) (44.720) (29.227) (45.473) (35.220)
2001 37.813 74.694 52.489 27.262 58.877 34.598
(35.078) (48.084) (44.971) (27.836) (45.191) (37.141)
2002 27.389 64.072 46.019 22.248 50.123 30.749
(29.691) (47.769) (43.849) (25.131) (42.686) (34.266)
2003 (H1) 9.423 24.179 17.408 7.708 19.087 12.697
(20.121) (40.108) (31.525) (16.055) (35.700) (24.900)
Regional labour market context
Strategy clusters
IIa 0.011 0.035 0.033 0.006 0.032 0.012
IIb 0.159 0.153 0.147 0.152 0.183 0.175
IIIa 0.127 0.069 0.095 0.108 0.082 0.097
IIIb 0.080 0.090 0.094 0.094 0.066 0.072
IIIc 0.222 0.226 0.223 0.200 0.164 0.213
IV 0.118 0.151 0.129 0.122 0.241 0.153
Va 0.036 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.048
Vb 0.168 0.152 0.176 0.175 0.140 0.151
Vc 0.079 0.085 0.066 0.107 0.061 0.079
a Standard deviations, where applicable, are in parenthesis.
31Table A.2: Propensity Score Estimation Results - Coeﬃcientsa
SUS vs. Non-Participation BA vs. Non-Participation
Men Women Men Women
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age category
25-29 0.617 ∗ ∗ 1.030 ∗ ∗ 0.298 0.526
(0.235) (0.363) (0.246) (0.455)
30-34 0.871 ∗ ∗ 0.834∗ 0.274 0.419
(0.245) (0.352) (0.248) (0.439)
35-39 0.481+ 0.678+ 0.252 0.486
(0.248) (0.349) (0.244) (0.434)
40-44 0.669 ∗ ∗ 0.861∗ 0.105 0.427
(0.254) (0.351) (0.253) (0.442)
45-49 0.652∗ 0.824∗ 0.165 0.425
(0.273) (0.360) (0.265) (0.454)
50-64 1.223 ∗ ∗ 1.369 ∗ ∗ 0.356 0.803+
(0.282) (0.382) (0.287) (0.479)
Family status: Married −0.028 −0.001 0.137 −0.113
(Ref.: Not married) (0.139) (0.134) (0.120) (0.161)
Children (Ref.: No children)
One child 0.183 0.097 −0.133 0.272
(0.176) (0.175) (0.144) (0.224)
Two or more children 0.000 −0.027 −0.257+ 0.036
(0.177) (0.188) (0.135) (0.257)
With health restrictions −0.084 −0.116 −0.072 0.043
(0.196) (0.289) (0.212) (0.377)
Nationality: German 0.016 −0.074 0.180+ −0.127
(0.114) (0.137) (0.103) (0.175)
Desired working time: Full-time −0.209 −0.023 −0.085 0.682 ∗ ∗
(0.407) (0.152) (0.466) (0.216)
Qualiﬁcation variables
School degree
Lower secondary schooling −0.064 0.903 0.370 0.165
(0.309) (0.597) (0.347) (0.847)
Middle secondary schooling −0.024 0.864 0.443 0.536
(0.323) (0.599) (0.357) (0.847)
Specialised upper sec. schooling −0.036 0.764 0.411 0.589
(0.343) (0.621) (0.368) (0.864)
Upper secondary schooling −0.160 1.019+ 0.380 0.323
(0.343) (0.608) (0.368) (0.856)
Occupational group (in previous profession)
Idiwberuf1 0.517 −0.232 0.229 −0.376
(0.322) (0.636) (0.378) (0.943)
Idiwberuf4 −0.566∗ 0.491 0.235 −0.090
(0.249) (0.350) (0.168) (0.458)
Idiwberuf5 −0.113 −0.101 −0.047 0.084
(0.120) (0.229) (0.112) (0.333)
Idiwberuf6 −0.476∗ −0.408 −0.715 ∗ ∗ −0.535
(0.234) (0.311) (0.249) (0.472)
Job Qualiﬁcation
Idiwquali0 −0.089 −0.075 −0.300 0.379
(0.221) (0.245) (0.187) (0.324)
Idiwquali1 −0.116 −0.151 −0.199 0.256
(0.233) (0.352) (0.188) (0.437)
Idiwquali2 −0.122 −0.098 −0.160 0.190
(0.133) (0.166) (0.133) (0.260)
Labour market history
Duration of last unemployment
3 months - < 6 months −0.353∗ −0.907 ∗ ∗ −0.406 ∗ ∗ −0.748 ∗ ∗
(0.147) (0.173) (0.122) (0.206)
6 months - < 1 year −0.436 ∗ ∗ −0.450 ∗ ∗ −0.459 ∗ ∗ −0.284
(0.140) (0.159) (0.121) (0.196)
≥ 1 year −0.517 ∗ ∗ −0.696 ∗ ∗ −0.629 ∗ ∗ −1.140 ∗ ∗
(0.192) (0.237) (0.192) (0.324)
With work experiences −0.129 −0.340+ −0.169 −0.585 ∗ ∗
(0.149) (0.183) (0.135) (0.219)
Number of placement propositions −0.004 −0.015 −0.015∗ −0.019
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013)
Unemployment beneﬁts −0.046 ∗ ∗ −0.032 ∗ ∗ 0.022 ∗ ∗ 0.035 ∗ ∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Remaining beneﬁt entitlement −0.041 ∗ ∗ −0.065 ∗ ∗ −0.056 ∗ ∗ −0.050∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020)
Continued on next page.
32Table A.2 continued.
SUS vs. Non-Participation BA vs. Non-Participation
Men Women Men Women
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Months in unemployment
1999 0.000 −0.001 −0.030 −0.004
(0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.041)
2000 −0.040 −0.047 −0.047+ −0.013
(0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.041)
2001 0.017 0.065∗ −0.035 −0.071+
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.041)
2002 0.012 −0.024 −0.001 0.051
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.036)
Months in regular employment
1999 −0.004 0.025 −0.004 0.021
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.029)
2000 0.002 0.010 −0.007 0.008
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034)
2001 0.010 0.045+ −0.021 0.026
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.036)
2002 0.051+ 0.027 −0.006 0.000
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.035)
Daily income from regular employment
1999 0.002 0.002 0.005∗ 0.008+
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
2000 −0.003 −0.000 −0.005 −0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
2001 0.005 −0.004 0.008∗ −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
2002 −0.012 ∗ ∗ −0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Employment status before unemployment
Self-employment 0.432+ 0.607+ −0.248 −0.089
(0.248) (0.327) (0.268) (0.420)
School/Non-employed 0.417∗ 0.547∗ 0.449∗ 0.693∗
(0.190) (0.258) (0.189) (0.333)
Unemployability 0.341 0.422+ 0.327 −0.128
(0.212) (0.255) (0.215) (0.371)
Other but once employed 0.686 ∗ ∗ 0.807 ∗ ∗ 0.548 ∗ ∗ 0.479+
(0.183) (0.217) (0.185) (0.286)
Others 1.033∗ 0.198 0.937∗ −0.487
(0.458) (0.565) (0.473) (1.155)
Regional labour market context - Strategy clusters
IIb 1.372 ∗ ∗ 1.069 −0.088 −1.413 ∗ ∗
(0.431) (0.657) (0.265) (0.522)
IIIa 1.308 ∗ ∗ 1.020 −0.456 −1.312∗
(0.436) (0.664) (0.286) (0.542)
IIIb 1.087∗ 1.196+ 0.012 −1.310∗
(0.444) (0.670) (0.280) (0.562)
IIIc 1.156 ∗ ∗ 0.888 −0.214 −1.646 ∗ ∗
(0.425) (0.652) (0.258) (0.522)
IV 1.433 ∗ ∗ 0.968 −0.103 −1.225∗
(0.437) (0.660) (0.268) (0.519)
Va 1.189∗ 0.576 0.184 −1.669 ∗ ∗
(0.486) (0.700) (0.327) (0.615)
Vb 1.272 ∗ ∗ 1.085+ −0.433 −1.284∗
(0.430) (0.657) (0.264) (0.521)
Vc 1.398 ∗ ∗ 1.365∗ 0.085 −1.568 ∗ ∗
(0.453) (0.671) (0.288) (0.568)
Constant −0.393 −1.537 −0.500 −1.224
(0.733) (1.013) (0.706) (1.154)
Log-likelihood −1196.329 −885.819 −1546.651 −596.322
Hit-Rate 40.133 48.135 47.317 39.896
33Table A.3: Cross-Validation for the Bandwidth Selection
Start-Up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
h RMSE h RMSE h RMSE h RMSE
0.00558 0.45009 0.04673 0.38910 0.09087 0.42773 1.04953 0.36659
0.01558 0.45110 0.05673 0.38956 0.10087 0.42788 1.05953 0.36659
0.02558 0.45016 0.06673 0.38955 0.11087 0.42795 1.06953 0.36658
0.03558 0.44909 0.07673 0.38962 0.12087 0.42803 1.07953 0.36658
0.04558 0.44878 0.08673 0.38963 0.13087 0.42810 1.08953 0.36658
0.05558 0.44870 0.09673 0.38963 0.14087 0.42823 1.09953 0.36658
0.06558 0.44887 0.10673 0.38972 0.15087 0.42837 1.10953 0.36658
0.07558 0.44916 0.11673 0.38976 0.16087 0.42851 1.11953 0.36658
0.07558 0.44916 0.12673 0.38973 0.17087 0.42866 1.12953 0.36658
0.07558 0.44916 0.13673 0.38970 0.18087 0.42882 1.13953 0.36658
0.07558 0.44916 0.14673 0.38963 0.19087 0.42897 1.14953 0.36657
Note: We implement leave-one out cross-validation in a ﬁve step procedure (see, e.g.,
(Galdo, 2005)):
1. Deﬁne a bandwidth search grid. Here, we use lbw + 0.05 × g for g = 0,1,2,...,20,
where lbw = max[min[|P0i − P0−i|,|P0i − P0+i|]] is a lower bound deﬁned by the
propensity score values of comparison group members in the support region.
2. Starting with the lowest bandwidth and using only the comparison sample, esti-
mate the counterfactual outcome of each comparison unit using kernel matching
on the remaining N0−1 observations. Find the weighted MISE for that particular
bandwidth.
3. Repeat step 2 for each of the remaining bandwidth values. Find the particular
bandwidth h
+ that minimizes the weighted MISE across all estimations.
4. Reﬁne the bandwidth h
+ by deﬁning a +/ − 0.05 neighborhood around h
+ and
select a new search grid.
5. Repeat steps 2 and 3 and select the bandwidth that yields the minimum weighted
MISE among all estimations.
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